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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant's assertion of jurisdiction is incorrect. As set forth more fully hereafter,
this Court has no jurisdiction because the Notice of Appeal is defective in failing properly
to designate the order appealed from. Utah R. App. P. 3(d). Accordingly, the appeal
must be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction.
Preservation of Issue: Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See Jensen
v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10,ffll5-7, 977 P.2d 474; Kennedy v. New Era
Industries, Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979).
Standard of Review: Original issue. See Jensen, supra.
2. Whether the district court correctly interpreted the note and trust deed to require
reconveyance of all trust property upon full payment of the face amount of the loan.
Preservation of Issue: Raised by cross-motions for summary judgment. (R. 23-25,
70-72.)
Standard of Review: Correctness. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell,
824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992).
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs postjudgment motion to amend the complaint.
Preservation of Issue: Post-judgment motion. (R. 181-83.)

Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Atcitty v. Board of Educ, 967 P.2d
1261, 1264 (Utah App. 1998) (no abuse of discretion in denying amendment of complaint
after cross-motions for summary judgment).
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
The jurisdictional issue is determined by Utah R. App. P. 3(d) and cases decided
thereunder. The reconveyance issue is determined by U.C.A. §§ 57-1-20, -33.1. The
amendment issue is determined by Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a), and cases decided thereunder.
These rules and statutes are reproduced verbatim in the Addendum, attached hereto.
(Add. 53-57.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action involves a dispute over reconveyance of trust property following full
payment of the debt secured by the property. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that
reconveyance is not required until a prior, unrelated debt is also paid. (R. 1.) Defendant
Furstenau filed a motion for summary judgment, demonstrating that the face amount of
the loan was fully paid and that the unambiguous terms of the note and trust deed require
reconveyance of all trust property. (R. 25-31, 106-16.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment, arguing that the unambiguous terms of the note require payment of a
prior, unrelated debt ("Camillo Note") owed by defendant Nebeker. (R. 72-85.) The
district court granted defendant Furstenau summary judgment, ruling that the
"unambiguous language" of the note and trust deed set the loan amount at $150,000 and
requires reconveyance of all trust property upon payment of that amount. The court also

awarded defendant Furstenau attorney fees and costs. (Ruling, 3/2/00, R. 144-48, Add.
1.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed an objection to attorney fees and a Motion for New
Trial, Motion to Amend Ruling or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint. (R. 158,
181.) In one Ruling, the court reduced the amount of attorney fees. (Ruling, 5/24/00, R.
215-17, Add. 15.) In a subsequent ruling, the court denied plaintiffs motion for new
trial, reaffirming its initial ruling that the Camillo Note was not secured by the trust deed,
and that all trust property was therefore required to be reconveyed upon payment of the
$150,000 face amount of the note and trust deed. (Ruling, 9/21/00, R. 245-48, Add. 21.)
The court also denied plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint as "untimely and legally
insufficient." {Id. at 247.) Plaintiff appeals from the May 24 Ruling on attorney fees, and
also cites a supposed "September 25, 2000" ruling, which appears to be merely a revised
draft that was never issued to the parties. (R. 267, 254-58, Add. 31, 26.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs statement of facts refers to supposed negotiations and circumstances
surrounding the signing of the loan documents that are not properly considered under the
parol evidence rule. Therefore, such facts are not material to the issues presented.
Following is a statement of the undisputed material facts.
On February 1, 1999, defendants Robert Furstenau and Blair Nebeker signed a
Promissory Note ("Promissory Note") in the face amount of $150,000. The Promissory
Note was drafted by plaintiffs attorney, Richard Tretheway. The Promissory Note
3

evidences the obligation to repay a business loan extended to defendants by plaintiff,
Sandra Tretheway, trustee of the Tretheway Family Trust. The Promissory Note recites
that it is secured by a Deed of Trust. (R. 32, 36-39; Add. 36.)1
That same day, as part of the same transaction, defendants also signed the
referenced Deed of Trust ("Trust Deed"). The Trust Deed recites that its purpose is to
secure "payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof
in the principal sum of $150,000." (R. 32, 43; Add. 32, 42.) The property conveyed by
the Trust Deed consists of two separate parcels, one containing an apartment building
("Apartment Property") and the other containing a gas station ("Gas Station Property")
(together referred to as the "Trust Property"). The legal descriptions of these two parcels
are set forth in the "Exhibit A" attached to the Trust Deed. (R. 33, 48; Add. 34, 47.)
On June 23, 1999, defendants paid to plaintiff the full amount owing on the
Promissory Note, $151,728 (face amount plus interest), and requested reconveyance of
the Trust Property. (R. 33, 50; Add. 34, 48.) However, plaintiff subsequently reconveyed
only the Apartment Property. (R. 33, 52-53; Add. 34, 49.) Plaintiff refused to reconvey
the Gas Station Property, withholding reconveyance until defendants paid an additional
$53,400, plus interest and attorney fees, to satisfy a prior, unrelated debt owed to plaintiff
by defendant Nebeker. This prior debt was supposedly evidenced by a separate note

1

Plaintiff asserts, incorrectly, that Nebeker and Furstenau were "partners." (Br. of App. 3.) That
assertion is immaterial and unsupported in the record.
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described as the "Camillo Note/9 although plaintiff has provided no copy of the Camillo
Note, and no copy exists in the record. (R. 2, 7. 33, 87, 127.)2
Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action, seeking a declaration that she is not
required to reconvey the Gas Station Property until defendants pay an additional $53,400,
pursuant to the third release provision of the Promissory Note. (R. 1-3.) Defendant
Furstenau moved for summary judgment, demonstrating that the unambiguous terms of
the Promissory Note and Trust Deed require reconveyance of all Trust Property upon
payment of the face amount of the loan. Because the Camillo Note is nowhere mentioned
in the Trust Deed, the Trust Property cannot be withheld as security for that note. (R. 23,
27-30, 109-16.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
"unambiguous" language of the Promissory Note required payment of $53,400, in
addition to the face amount of the Promissory Note, prior to reconveyance of the Gas
Station Property. (R. 75-85.)
The district court granted summary judgment to defendant Furstenau. The court
construed the "unambiguous language" of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed to
conclude that the third release provision of the Promissory Note merely allows for an
optional, partial release of Trust Property upon partial payment of the debt. That

2

The record does not show, and plaintiff has not bothered to explain, the origin of this supposed prior
obligation from Nebeker to Tretheway, or how it is secured by the Camillo Note, or who signed the
Camillo Note, or the legal relationship that connects Tretheway to Nebeker and Camillo. Plaintiffs
entire claim is based only on a vague reference to the Camillo Note in the third release provision of the
Promissory Note, as discussed hereafter. However, the Camillo Note is nowhere mentioned in the Trust
Deed. Rather, the Camillo Note was apparently secured by separate property described as Lot 16,
Taylorsville Park Subdivision. (R. 33, 57, 61, 73.)
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provision has no application when the debt is paid in full. (Ruling, 3/2/00, R. 144; Add.
1.) The secured debt is $150,000, and plaintiff cannot re-write the Trust Deed as securing
a debt of $203,400. Accordingly, the court ordered reconveyance of the Gas Station
Property and awarded costs and attorney fees to defendant Furstenau. {Id. at 146-47.)
The court initially entered a Final Judgment incorporating its Ruling of March 2.
(R. 154; Add. 7.) Plaintiff filed a subsequent objection, going only to the amount of
attorney fees and the wording of the reconveyance order. (R. 158.) In response, the court
set aside its judgment and granted an Amended Final Judgment, reducing the fees
awarded but rejecting any other change. (Ruling, 5/24/00, R. 215; Add. 15.) The
Amended Final Judgment, while filed and "entered" by the court, is not signed by the
court. (R. 177; Add. 11.)
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for New Trial, Motion to Amend Ruling or in the
Alternative to Amend Complaint. (R. 181.) Treating the motion for new trial as a motion
to reconsider, the district court reaffirmed its Ruling of March 2. The court held that
there are no material issues of fact. Rather, the central question of whether the Camillo
Note is secured by the Trust Deed is a legal question decided on "the plain language of
the documents involved, without regard to extrinsic evidence." (Ruling, 9/21/00, R. 246;
Add. 22.) The court concluded that because the Promissory Note and Trust Deed require
reconveyance of all Trust Property upon repayment of $150,000, defendant Furstenau is
entitled to summary judgment. {Id. at 246-47.) The court denied the motion to amend the
complaint as untimely because it was filed after the court had already decided the case by
6

summary judgment. In addition, the proposed amendment to add a reformation claim is
"legally insufficient" because there is no evidence of mutual mistake. (Id. at 247.)
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on October 23, 2000, appealing specifically from
the May 24 Ruling on attorney fees, and from a supposed ruling on September 25, 2000.
(R. 267; Add. 31.) However, the supposed September 25 ruling (R. 254), filed in the
record with other drafts and notes of the court (R. 259-64), appears to be only a revised
draft of the court's actual Ruling issued on September 21 (R. 245). As shown by the
blank mailing certificate, which plaintiff failed to include in the addendum to her brief,
the September 25 draft ruling was never issued to the parties. (R. 258; Add. 30.)
Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal makes no reference to the district court's actual final Ruling
of September 21, which disposed of the motion for new trial. (R. 267.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court lacks jurisdiction of the appeal because plaintiff failed to designate the
order appealed from in her Notice of AppeaL as required by law. This case involves four
different court rulings, two final judgments, two post-judgment motions, and two notices
of appeal. Plaintiffs second Notice of Appeal refers to one non-final ruling pertaining to
attorney fees and to an invalid draft ruling that was never issued to the parties. The
Notice of Appeal does not refer specifically to any final, appealable order. Appellee is
entitled to know specifically which judgment or ruling is being appealed. Plaintiffs
failure to comply with this jurisdictional requirement prejudiced appellee by precluding a

7

cross-appeal and forcing appellee to incur the expense of analyzing all rulings and
judgments to determine jurisdiction and formulate defenses to the appeal.
Plaintiff wrongfully withheld Trust Property after the loan secured by the property
was fully paid. Under Utah law, trust property may be held only as security for the
obligation for which it was conveyed. Upon payment of the obligation, the trust property
must be reconveyed. The unambiguous terms of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed set
the principal amount of the loan at $150,000 and require release of all Trust Property
upon payment of that amount. The Gas Station Property cannot be withheld as security
for the Camillo Note because the Trust Deed nowhere mentions that note, and the
Promissory Note does not require payment of $53,400 in addition to the principal sum of
$150,000. Moreover, extrinsic evidence cannot be considered to alter the plain terms of
the loan documents.
The district court was within its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend
the complaint to add a reformation claim. The motion was untimely because the court
had already decided all legal issues by summary judgment, and plaintiff had no good
reason for not raising the claim sooner. The proposed amendment was also legally
insufficient because it was based on a supposed mutual mistake regarding security for the
Camillo Note. However, because defendant Furstenau did not share in that "mistake," it
cannot be considered "mutual" so as to justify reformation.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE NOTICE
OF APPEAL FAILS PROPERLY TO DESIGNATE THE ORDER
APPEALED FROM.

Rule 3(d), Utah R. App. P., states that "the notice of appeal... shall designate the
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from." This requirement is jurisdictional.
Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, ^j 7, 977 P.2d 474. The purpose of
the requirement is "to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken from a
specific judgment in a particular case. Respondent is entitled to know specifically which
judgment is being appealed." Id. (emp. added). For example, in Jensen, the notice of
appeal referred to the jury verdict and a ruling denying post-judgment motions; it failed to
refer to the order or final judgment granting partial summary judgment. Id. \ 6.
Accordingly, the court held that it did "not have jurisdiction to review .. . claims relating
to the partial summary judgment." Id. ^f 9.
Similarly, in Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 388 P.2d 798 (Utah 1964), the
notice of appeal referred to a void judgment disposing of a late motion for new trial,
instead of citing the original judgment. The court noted the resulting problem of
determining "which judgment is final and which is being appealed." Id. at 800. Because
the court entered more than one judgment, the date of judgment cited in the notice of
appeal "becomes material" in allowing the respondent to defend the appeal. Id. The
court dismissed the appeal because the notice of appeal did not cite the actual final
judgment. A/, at 801. See also Sierra Nevada MM Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co.* 156P.943,
9

945-46 (Utah 1916) (appeal dismissed for failure to identify the final judgment in the
notice of appeal; "the notice of appeal should itself so sufficiently describe and identify
the judgment appealed from as to show what was intended without resorting to the
pleadings . . . or to cause hunting in and leafing of the record for another judgment");
Allen v Garner, 143 P. 228, 231-32 (Utah 1914) (notice of appeal was "defective" and
"void" in failing to refer to the actual final judgment).
Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal refers to rulings dated May 24 and September 25,
2000 (R. 267); however, a review of the complex chronology of proceedings in the
district court demonstrates that neither of those rulings is appealable. The notice does not
refer specifically to any ruling that is appealable.
On March 2, 2000, the court entered its Ruling granting Furstenau summary
judgment, with attorney fees and costs, and denying plaintiffs cross-motion for summary
judgment. (R. 144.) On March 22, the court entered a Final Judgment on that Ruling.
(R. 154.) On March 27, plaintiff filed an Objection to Attorney Fees and Filing of Final
Judgment, challenging only the amount of attorney fees and the judgment's reference to
the Trust Deed as "void" in ordering full reconve\ ance. (R. 158.) Defense counsel
conceded the discrepancy in attorney fees and filed a corrected affidavit. (R. 161.) On
April 12, plaintiff also filed a Motion for New Trial, Motion to Amend Ruling or in the
Alternative to Amend Complaint. (R. 181.)
Treating plaintiffs March 27 objection as a timely motion to alter or amend the
judgment, the court entered a Ruling, dated May 24, setting aside its Final Judgment and
10

entering an Amended Final Judgment with the corrected total for attorney fees. (R. 215.)
No other change was made. While the Amended Final Judgment is unsigned (R. 177-79),
the May 24 Ruling also recites that it stands as the Order of the Court, making entry of an
additional judgment unnecessary (R. 217).
On June 21, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the May 24 Ruling. (R. 228.)
However, plaintiffs motion for new trial or amendment remained pending. While the
motion for new trial was untimely with respect to the original Final Judgment, the court's
setting aside of that judgment and entry of an Amended Final Judgment rendered the
motion for new trial timely. See Regan v. Blount, 978 P.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Utah App.
1999) (post-judgment motion filed more than 10 days after judgment but prior to
amended judgment is timely). However, because the May 24 Ruling did not dispose of
the pending motion for new trial, that Ruling did not constitute a final judgment for
purposes of appeal. Therefore, plaintiffs premature Notice of Appeal from the May 24
Ruling is ineffective. Id. at 1054 (the pending motion "suspends the finality" of the
amended judgment and "renders the notice of appeal ineffective"); Utah R. App. P. 4(b).
The district court finally disposed of the pending motions in its Ruling of
September 21. (R. 245.) The court denied the motion to reconsider its summary
judgment Ruling of March 2, stating that it "remains convinced of the correctness of this
decision." (R. 246.) The court denied the proposed amended complaint as "untimely and
legally insufficient." (R. 247.) The court concluded that this "Memorandum Decision
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will stand as the Order of the Court," and that no further order would be necessary. (R.
248.)
On September 25, the court signed another draft of the same Ruling it had entered
on September 21, simply rephrasing one sentence on page 3 for clarity, without affecting
the substance of the Ruling. (R. 254.) This draft ruling, which bears a filing date of
October 4, appears in the record with other draft pages and notes of the court, and the
mailing certificate is blank. (R. 258.) Accordingly, the September 25 draft is not, and
was not intended to be, the actual ruling of the court, and was never issued to the parties.
Even if the September 25 draft ruling had been properly entered and issued as an
amended ruling of the court, it would not be an appealable order because it did "not
chang[e] the substance or character of the judgment"; rather, it would be merely a
"belated," "nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to the time the original judgment was
entered," without altering the judgment or the time for appeal. Nielson v. Gurley, 888
P.2d 130, 132 (Utah App. 1994).
Accordingly, plaintiffs Notice of Appeal is jurisdictional^ defective in failing to
refer to any final, appealable order. The May 24 Ruling is not a final order because the
motion for new trial was still pending. Even as a nonfmal order, the scope of the Ruling
is limited to attorney fees and a reference to the Trust Deed as "void," neither of which is
challenged on this appeal. The Ruling does not go to the merits of the original summary
judgment ruling. The May 24 Ruling purports to "enter" an Amended Final Judgment,
but that judgment was never signed; therefore, it was not properly "entered." Utah R.
12

Civ. P. 58A(c). In short, the May 24 Ruling presents no basis for appeal, and the
September 25 draft ruling is not a valid appealable order. Only the Ruling of September
21, which is not cited in the Notice of Appeal, is final and appealable on the merits of the
summary judgment and motion to amend, the two issues on appeal. Thus, plaintiffs
Notice of Appeal plainly fails to "designate the judgment. . . appealed from." Utah R.
App. P. 3(d).
Moreover, plaintiffs failure to designate an appealable judgment in the Notice of
Appeal is prejudicial to defendant. In a case like the present, with complex procedural
turns, including four different court rulings, two post-judgment motions, original and
amended judgments, and two notices of appeal, specific designation of the appealed
judgment "becomes material." Nunley, supra, at 800. Defendant is prejudiced in being
required to expend several hours of attorney time "hunting in and leafing [through] the
record for another [appealable] judgment." Sierra Nevada Mill Co., supra, at 946. The
[Respondent is entitled to know specifically which judgment is being appealed," not only
to defend the appeal on the merits, but to determine and challenge the assertion of
appellate jurisdiction. Jensen, supra, at 476 (emp. added). Without knowing which of
several rulings is being challenged, and which provides the basis for appellate
jurisdiction, the appellee is placed at a disadvantage in determining whether jurisdiction
exists. The result is that every ruling must be examined as a possible basis for
jurisdiction, thereby escalating the cost of defending the appeal. The appellate rules
specifically place the burden of designating the challenged judgment and defining the
13

basis for jurisdiction on the appellant. Utah R. App. P. 3(a) and (d), 9(c)(l)-(2), 24(a)(4).
By submitting a notice of appeal that fails to designate the appealed judgment, or that
generally refers to "all rulings'' of the court, the appellant unfairly shifts that burden and
expense to the appellee. Because plaintiffs Notice of Appeal fails to comply with the
basic jurisdictional requirement of Rule 3(d), the appeal must be dismissed. Jensen and
Nunley, supra?
POINT II:

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE
PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST DEED TO REQUIRE
RECONVEYANCE OF ALL TRUST PROPERTY UPON
REPAYMENT OF THE FACE AMOUNT OF THE LOAN.

The parties do not dispute the standard of review, governing legal principles, or
rules for construction of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed. However, they do dispute
the legal interpretation of those documents, as plaintiffs interpretation would nullify the
purpose and terms of the Trust Deed. Defendant also challenges plaintiffs belated
attempt to rely on extrinsic evidence for interpretation of the documents.
A,

Law Governing Reconveyance of Trust Property.
The use and operation of trust deeds is governed by statute. Section 57-1-20

provides that real property may be transferred in trust "to secure the performance of an
obligation of the trustor." The trustee holds the trust property only "as security for the

3

The additional prejudice identified in Jensen, of precluding a cross-appeal, is also present here.
1999 UT 10, ^ 8. Upon receiving the Notice of Appeal and seeing that the only valid ruling cited was the
May 24 Ruling, defendant was reasonably justified in concluding that the appeal would be limited to the
issue of attorney fees. Had plaintiff cited the September 21 Ruling, dealing with the merits of the
summary judgment motions, defendant could have cross-appealed the court's denial of damages under
57-1-38(3) for wrongful retention of trust property following payment of the loan.
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obligation . . . for which the trust property is conveyed." Id. As set forth in section 57-133.1(l)(a), when the obligation is satisfied, the trustee is required to reconvey the trust
property:
When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust
property. [Emp. added.]
Accordingly, the trustee may hold the trust property only as security for the debt for
which the property is conveyed. Once that debt is satisfied, reconveyance of the trust
property is mandatory. The trustee may not retain the trust property as security for a
different debt.
This well-established principle is illustrated in the case of Hector} Inc. v. United
Savings and Loan Ass 'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). There, a developer executed a note
and trust deed to secure payment of a construction loan. The developer also obtained an
unsecured improvement bond from the lender's affiliate. After the construction loan was
fully repaid, the lender refused to reconvey a portion of the trust property until the city
released the improvement bond, which was being held to ensure completion of off-site
improvements. The Utah Supreme Court held that the lender breached its statutory duty
to reconvey the entire trust property upon repayment of the secured loan.
Construing the predecessor of section 57-1-33.1, quoted above, the Hector court
explained that the statute serves the "purpose of protecting borrowers who secure their
debt by an interest in real estate from lenders who refuse to return the security when the
debt is discharged." 741 P.2d at 545. The court continued:
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The statutes hold lenders to a high degree of care and promptness in
clearing title to a borrower's property when the debt is paid since the lender
no longer has a legitimate interest in the security and the borrower has
great interest in freeing the property of the security interest. [Id., emp.
added.]
The court held that the lender's retention of the trust property "to secure a different
obligation" manifested bad faith: "United9s use of the leverage of refusing to reconvey the
land securing the trust deed to obtain security for another debt is not goodfaith by any
reckoning." Id. (emp. added). "Withholding performance under one contract to compel a
contracting party to do an act with respect to another independent contract is not good
faith." Id. The lender had no legal right to force the developer to provide security for the
improvement bond. Id. The court concluded that by refusing to reconvey the entire trust
property upon payment of the underlying debt, the lender "unequivocably breached its
statutory obligation and had no good faith excuse to justify its breach." Id. at 546. See
also Swaner v. Union Mortgage Co., 105 P.2d 342, 344-45 (Utah 1940) (lender
wrongfully refused to release mortgage in attempt to compel payment of unsecured loan
costs); Jenkins v. Equipment Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah App. 1994) (repair
shop wrongfully withheld repaired tractor as security for payment of other amounts due
on open account).
Based on the foregoing statutes and case law, plaintiff breached its statutory and
contractual duty to reconvey the entire trust property upon payment of the secured debt.
As demonstrated below, plaintiff had no right to withhold the Gas Station Property as
security for payment of an unrelated prior debt.
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B.

Terms and Construction of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed.
The first and foremost rule of contract interpretation is to determine the intent of

the parties from the four corners of the document. The purpose of this rule is "to preserve
the sanctity of written instruments." Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061
(Utah 1981). "It is only when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an
objective and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole that resort may be had
to the use of extrinsic evidence." Id. at 1062 (emp. added). Whether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law. Wade v. StangU 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994).
However, a provision is not necessarily ambiguous simply because the parties offer
differing interpretations. Gate City Federal Savings and Loan v. Dalton, 808 P.2d 1117,
1120 (Utah App. 1991). If the contract is subject to an "objective and reasonable
interpretation" on its face, the court should not resort to consideration of extrinsic
evidence. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, supra, at 1062 (trial court erred in considering
extrinsic evidence of the meaning of a promissory note). See also Interwest Construction
v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996) (court must look first to the four corners of
the contract to determine both intent and the existence of ambiguity); Trolley Square
Assoc, v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994) (contract need not be a "model of
clarity" to permit construction without resort to extrinsic evidence).
Another "well-established rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to
construction of a contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn the
agreement." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982) (holding that seller of
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land wrongfully refused to release mortgage upon payment of purchase price). It is
"settled law that a contract will be construed against the drafter." Parks Enterprises v.
New Century Realty, 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982). "'In choosing among the
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is
generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from
whom a writing otherwise proceeds/" Jones Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson,
923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah 1996), quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206
(1981). Here, plaintiff concedes that the Promissory Note was drafted by her attorney,
Richard L. Tretheway. Accordingly, this Court should resolve any uncertainty between
reasonable interpretations of the Promissory Note against plaintiff.
Examination of the terms of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed, under the
foregoing principles, demonstrates that the secured debt was $150,000, and no more. The
heading of the Promissory Note states that it is secured by the Trust Deed. (Add. 36.)
The next line recites the face "Amount: $150,000.00." Further on the first page, under
Borrower's Promise, is the recitation that borrowers "have received of $150,000.00 (this
amount will be called 'principal'),... BORROWERS will repay to the Lender the
principal amount of the loan." (Id.) Thus, the Promissory Note is not in the principal
amount of $150,000plus $53,400, or in the total amount of $203,400, as argued by
plaintiff. The "principal" is plainly defined as $150,000, and the borrowers specifically
promise to repay "the principal amount of the loan," no more.
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The Trust Deed is perfectly consistent with the Promissory Note, reciting that it is
provided 'Tor the Purpose of Securing: (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a
promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum of$150,000.00"

(Add. 42,

emp. added.) No other debt is mentioned; the Camillo Note is not mentioned. The Trust
Deed goes on to state that it may also secure "additional loans as hereafter may be made
to Trustor," but only "when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they
are secured by this Deed of Trust" {Id,, emp. added.) The Camillo Note was not made
"hereafter," but predated the Trust Deed, and no evidence has been presented that the
Camillo Note recites that it is secured by this Trust Deed. Accordingly, the Trust Deed
secures payment of only the "principal sum of $150,000.00," no more.
Regarding the Trust Property, the Trust Deed recites that it conveys to the trustee
the property described in "Exhibit'A' attached and made a part hereof." (Add. 47.) The
attached Exhibit A describes, on the same page, first the Apartment Property and below
that the Gas Station Property. By the terms of the documents, and as required by section
57-1-33.1, plaintiff is required to reconvey all Trust Property, both parcels, upon payment
of the $150,000 principal amount of the Promissory Note. Nowhere does the Trust Deed
authorize the trustee to retain any portion of the Trust Property following full payment of
the face amount of the loan.
Plaintiff relies on the release provisions of the Promissory Note to justify retention
of the Gas Station Property to secure payment of the Camillo Note; however, that position
is strained and unsupported by the language of the documents. The first release provision
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allows for release of individual apartments for each payment of $20,000. (Add. 38.) The
second release provision states that upon payment of the full $150,000, the Trust Deed
property in Exhibit A "shall be released." {Id.) Plaintiff interprets this to mean the
Exhibit A attached to the Promissory Note. (Br. of App. 10.) However, unlike the first
release provision, which does refer to the Exhibit A "attached hereto," the second
provision refers to the Exhibit A to the "Trust Deed." The Exhibit A attached to the
Promissory Note is not a "Trust Deed," but a "Warranty Deed," with no legal description
of any property at all. (Add. 40.) Accordingly, the second release provision can only
refer to the Trust Deed Exhibit A, which includes the legal descriptions of both parcels of
Trust Property. This interpretation is consistent with the terms of the Trust Deed,
discussed above, which recite that the Trust Property secures payment of a debt "in the
principal sum of $150,000.00." Upon payment of that sum, the full Trust Property would
naturally be released.
The third release provision does not alter that interpretation. It states that "the
property described in Exhibit 'B' attached hereto shall be released on the payment of the
sum of $53,400.00 for the purchase of the note Described as the Camillo note." (Add. 38,
emp. added.) The Exhibit B attached to the Promissory Note is a legal description of the
Gas Station Property. Accordingly, the Gas Station Property would be released upon the
partial loan payment of $53,400. This third provision nowhere states that the $53,400
was to be paid in addition to the $150,000 principal sum of the Promissory Note.
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Because defendants chose the second release provision, paying off the full amount of the
loan for release of all Trust Property, this third release provision never came into play.
Accordingly, the three release provisions in the Promissory Note are in complete
harmony with the other terms of the Note and Trust Deed. The release provisions provide
alternative options to pay off the loan and recover the corresponding Trust Property.
Defendants could either recover individual apartments through payments of $20,000,
recover the gas station through a payment of $53,400, or recover both the Apartment and
Gas Station Properties through payment of the full $150,000. Because defendants chose
the full-payment option, release options one and three do not apply. Because the
"principal" or face amount of the loan was fully paid, plaintiff cannot withhold part of the
Trust Property to secure an additional payment for the Camillo Note. Absent a clear
agreement, security given for one debt cannot be enforced as security for a different debt.
See, e.g., First Security Bank v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952, 957 (Utah 1980); Stockyards Nat.
Bank v. Capitol Steel & Iron Co., 441 P.2d 301, 303 (Kan. 1968). Trust property may be
held only "as security for the obligation . . . for which the trust property is conveyed."
U.C.A. § 57-1-20. When that obligation is paid, retention of the trust property to secure a
different debt is manifestly bad faith. Hector, Inc., supra, 741 P.2d at 545. Therefore,
defendant Furstenau is entitled to immediate reconveyance of the Gas Station Property.
Finally, plaintiff argues that, while the language of the Promissory Note is "precise
and unambiguous" (Br. of App. 11), this Court should find it "ambiguous" if necessary to
reverse the district court {id. at 13). While thus straddling both sides of the fence,
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plaintiff relies on the affidavit of defendant Nebeker to support her interpretation of the
loan documents. (Id. at 12.) However, as shown above, resort to extrinsic evidence is
forbidden unless the court first finds, as a matter of law, that the documents are
ambiguous. Utah Valley Bank, supra, 636 P.2d at 1061; Interwest Construction, supra,
923 P.2d at 1359. Because the Promissory Note and Trust Deed can be reconciled with
an "objective and reasonable interpretation," they are not ambiguous. Utah Valley Bank,
supra, at 1062. In fact, throughout the proceedings in the district court, plaintiff insisted
that the documents were "clear" and "unambiguous." (R. 77, 79, 81-82, 84, 122-23.) In
responding to Furstenau's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff identified no material
issue of fact, but instead urged the absence of a material fact dispute in support of her
own cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 70-75, 84-85.) The district court agreed
that resort to extrinsic evidence was unnecessary because the terms of the Promissory
Note and Trust Deed are "clear and unambiguous." (R. 146,246.) The court "looked
strictly to the plain language of the documents involved, without regard to extrinsic
evidence." (R. 246.) Accordingly, plaintiff may not now resort to extrinsic evidence to
obtain an interpretation of the documents contrary to their plain terms.
POINT III: THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND THE
COMPLAINT.
Plaintiff argues that because she did not expect the district court to interpret the
loan documents contrary to her position, the court should have allowed her to amend the
complaint to request reformation of the documents consistent with her interpretation. (Br,
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of App. 13-14.) In other words, because the documents do not support her position, the
court should have re-written them, after the fact, to conform with her position. This
argument borders on the frivolous, and the district court properly rejected the motion to
amend as untimely and legally insufficient. (Add.23 .)
Under Rule 15(a), Utah R. Civ. P., a motion to amend the complaint is addressed
to the discretion of the district court. The court's decision may not be reversed except for
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Atcitty v. Board of Educ.^ 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah App.
1998). In considering a motion to amend the complaint, Utah courts consider three
factors: 1) timeliness of the motion; 2) justification for delay; and 3) resulting prejudice to
the opposing party. Id. These factors require denial of the motion.
A motion to amend the complaint to add a new claim after the case has already
been decided on summary judgment is generally considered untimely and prejudicial.
For example, in Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920 (Utah 1994), the parents of a child
injured by a dog sued the dog owner under a theory of strict liability. After the court
denied the claim on summary judgment, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to
allege common law negligence. The court denied the amendment, and the Supreme Court
affirmed, concluding that the motion was untimely, and the plaintiffs presented no
justification for not asserting the negligence claim earlier. Id. at 922. On similar facts in
Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1991), the court denied a motion to
amend the complaint to assert a new claim after summary judgment because the motion
was untimely and "would almost certainly be prejudicial" to the opposing party. Id. at
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1189. See also Atcitty, supra, at 1264 (denying motion to amend complaint filed after a
motion for summary judgment); Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 253-54 (Utah
App. 1992) (denying motion to amend complaint filed in response to summary judgment
motion).
Based on these authorities, the motion here was properly denied as untimely
because the court had already disposed of the entire case, deciding all legal issues raised
in the cross-motions for summary judgment. If a plaintiff could simply amend the
complaint to assert new legal theories after the case is decided unfavorably, there would
be no end to litigation. To avoid wasteful piecemeal litigation, a plaintiff must be
expected to raise all viable legal theories before dispositive motions are filed.
Amendment of pleadings cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. Moreover, plaintiff
presented no justification for the delay in asserting the reformation claim. If the loan
documents were truly signed under a mutual mistake of fact, i.e., that the Camillo Note
was covered by the Trust Deed, then that mistake should reasonably have been apparent
to plaintiff when the original complaint and answer were filed. An amendment would be
plainly prejudicial because it would have the effect of starting the case all over again,
with the attendant loss of time and expense. Accordingly, the district court was within its
discretion in denying the amendment as untimely and prejudicial.
Under established Utah law, amendment of a complaint may also properly be
denied if the proposed amendment is futile or legally insufficient. An amendment that is
legally insufficient, and thus subject to a motion to dismiss, serves no valid purpose and is
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therefore properly denied as "futile." See, e.g., Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 292
(Utah 1992) (proposed amendment denied as "fruitless"); Andalex Resources, Inc. v.
Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994) (amendment of complaint "should be
denied" when the proposed claim is "legally insufficient or futile"). The district court
properly denied plaintiffs proposed amendment, seeking to reform the Promissory Note
and Trust Deed to secure the Camillo Note, as legally insufficient.
Plaintiff relies on the equitable theory of mutual mistake, arguing that Tretheway
and Nebeker intended the Trust Deed to secure the Camillo Note. (Br. of App. 14-16.)
However, "mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a
misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their
bargain." Neiderhauser Builders andDev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah
App. 1992) (emp. added). The most common example is when the legal description in a
deed erroneously fails to describe the property that both parties believed was being
conveyed. See Graham v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 325 n.3 (Utah App. 1990).
Reformation accomplishes equity by conforming the written instrument to the intent of all
parties. Id. In the present case, however, there is no mutual mistake because defendant
Furstenau never understood or intended that the Trust Deed would secure a debt of
$203,400 rather than the face amount of $150,000. (R. 118-19, 212-13, Add. 51.) Absent
such intent or understanding by all parties to the documents, there is no mutual mistake,
and those documents cannot fairly be reformed contrary to his intent. See Timm v.
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1390 (Utah 1996) (denying an amendment to reform a trust
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deed to exclude certain property because the lender had no such intent). Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the proposed amendment as legally
insufficient.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the judgment of the district court
and remand the case for an award of the additional costs and attorney fees incurred on
appeal.
Respectfully submitted this

//

aav of March, 2001.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

By:

£Z^C^^ 4^ ^%^7n
David M. Wahlquist
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of

COURT'S RULING

the Tretheway Family Trust,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.

990908053

vs.
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER,
U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3,
2000, in connection with the plaintiff's and defendant Robert
Furstenau's cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement and
informed counsel that they would be notified of the ruling by
telephone.

Upon further review of the moving and responding

memoranda, the Court decided that a written ruling was warranted.
Therefore, being fully advised of the facts in this matter and the
applicable law, the Court rules as stated herein.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 1, 1999, the defendants signed a Promissory Note,
promising to repay the plaintiff a $150,000 loan.

The defendants

also signed a Trust Deed, conveying two parcels of property, an

00144

a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the
Court's Ruling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no further force or effect as a
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0°01f East
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02' East 345.00 feet; thence North
89°45' West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents;
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in
this matter in the amount of $13,261.80 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling.
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TRETHEWAY V. FURSTENAU
Counsel

PAGE 5

for defendant Furstenau

COURT'S RULING
is to prepare an Order

consistent with this Court's Ruling, specifically indicating that
the plaintiff's Complaint against the defendants is dismissed.
Dated this

™ day of March, 2CKJ0\

"LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the
Court's Ruling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no further force or effect as a
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0C01' East
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02f East 345.00 feet; thence North
89°45* West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents;
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in
this matter in the amount of $11,220.00 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling.
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P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the
Tretheway Family Trust,

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 990908053

ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Nevada corporation,

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3, 2000, on the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the papers filed by
the parties, the Court issued its Ruling on March 2, 2000. Pursuant to that Ruling, the Court
hereby orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiff s Motion For Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted in part

and denied in part as follows:

Final J u d m e n t
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a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the
Court's Ruling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no further force or effect as a
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0°01' East
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02' East 345.00 feet; thence North
89°45' West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents;
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in
this matter in the amount of $13,261.80 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling.
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J.

This Final Judgment resolves all outstanding issues in this case.

<> 0 *v£l
Dated this ^

dayof March, 2000.

Honorable\Leslie A. Lewis .". \\
District-Judge - —•'•*. -•-,.'-
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
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Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
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Telephone: (801) 328-3600
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the
Tretheway Family Trust,

AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 990908053

ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Nevada corporation,

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on February 3, 2000, on the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the papers filed by
the parties, the Court issued its Ruling on March 2, 2000. Pursuant to that Ruling, the Court
hereby orders as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted in part

and denied in part as follows:
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a. plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice;
b. the Court hereby declares and orders that for the reasons set forth in the
Court's Ruling referenced above, that certain Deed of Trust With Assignment of Rents recorded
on February 1, 1999 as Entry No. 7241865 in Book 8245, Page 4727 of the Official Records of
the Salt Lake County Recorder is void, deemed reconveyed and of no further force or effect as a
lien or other encumbrance on the real property located in Salt Lake County described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB
HEIGHTS - PLAT A, according to the official plat thereof, filed in
Book "J" of Plats at Page 82 of the Official Records of the Salt
Lake County Recorder, and running thence North 0°01' East
215.79 feet; thence South 51°02' East 345.00 feet; thence North
89°45' West 268.31 feet to the point of BEGINNING
and further orders plaintiff to execute and deliver to defendant within ten (10) days from the date
of this Final Judgment a request for full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust and Assignment of
Rents in form and content sufficient to authorize the trustee therein to execute and record a deed
of full reconveyance of said Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents;
c. the Court hereby awards Robert Furstenau costs and attorneys fees incurred in
this matter in the amount of $11,220.00 which shall be paid by plaintiff to Robert Furstenau
within ten (10) days from the date hereof; and
d. the Court denies Robert Furstenau's motion to the extent it seeks damages
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-38(3) for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling.

?
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This Final Judgment resolves all outstanding issues in this case.
Dated this

day of April, 2000.
BY THE COURT

Honorable Leslie A. Lewis
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on this 3

day of April, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
D. David Lambert
Leslie W. Slaugh
Kenneth Parkinson
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603
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i hird Judicial District

MAY 2 h 2000
SAW LAKE CpjJNTY
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY/ trustee of
the Tretheway Family Trust,
Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING
CASE NO.

990908053

vs.
ROBERT FURSTENAU/ BLAIR NEBEKER/
U.P.N.L.C./ and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL/ INC./
a Nevada corporation/
Defendants.

A Notice to Submit has been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with the plaintiff's
Objection to Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Filing of Final
Judgment. Having reviewed the moving and responding memoranda, the
Court rules as stated herein.
The plaintiff's Objection is first directed towards the
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees filed by Mr. David M. Wahlquist,
attorney for defendant Furstenau. The plaintiff contends that the
Affidavit does not adequately describe the nature of services
performed by Mr. Wahlquist.

In response to the plaintiff's

concerns, Mr. Wahlquist has filed a Revised Affidavit of David M.
Wahlquist.

The Court determines that the Revised Affidavit

describes the services performed with sufficient specificity. The
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Court therefore overrules the plaintiff's Objection with respect to
the itemization of services.

In addition, having reviewed the

Revised Affidavit, the Court determines that the attorney's fees
requested are reasonable and necessary, given the complexity of the
issues involved and the need for counsel to review not only the
parties' present dealings (and the documents involved), but also to
consider and delve into the parties' prior dealings. Accordingly,
the Court overrules the plaintiff's Objection. The attorney's fees
sought are granted.
Next, the plaintiff Objects to the fact that the Final
Judgment is inconsistent, in declaring the Trust Deed void and
still ordering the plaintiff to reconvey it within ten days.

The

Court agrees with defendant Furstenau that while reconveyance may
technically be unnecessary, given the Court's ruling that the Trust
Deed has no force or effect, it would nevertheless provide a
definitive passage of the title free and clear of the Trust Deed.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's Objection on this basis is overruled.
Finally, the plaintiff objects to the Final Judgment because
of an inconsistency between the amount of fees and costs specified
in the Final Judgment and the amount set forth in Mr. Wahlquist's
Affidavit.

Defendant Furstenau recognizes this error and has

furnished the Court with an Amended Final Judgment which accurately
reflects the fees sought under the Revised Affidavit.

The Court

TRETHEWAY V. FURSTENAU
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sets aside the Final Judgment entered on March 22, 2000, and enters
the Amended Final Judgment, which the Court executed on a date
contemporaneous with this Court's Ruling.
This Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court, overruling
the plaintiff's Objection in the entirety.
Dated this (7* 'day of May, 2ac

JESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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HAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this 2j
2000:

D. David Lambert
Leslie W. Slaugh
Kenneth Parkinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
12 0 East 3 00 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
David M. Wahlquist
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant Furstenau
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0120

day of May,
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D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872),
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and
KENNETH PARKINSON (6778), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991
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Our File No. 25,213

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of
the Tretheway Family Trust,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and
ADVANCED PROPERTIES
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada
corporation,

Case No. 990908053
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
Plaintiff Sandra L. Tretheway hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court trom the
district court's Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment dated May 24, 2000, and from
all other adverse rulings in this case.
DATED this 60

day of June, 2000.

KENNETH PARKINSON for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, this

20 day of June, 2000, postage prepaid.
David M. Wahlquist, Esq.
Merrill F. Nelson, Esq.
Kirton & McConkie
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 21 ?ono
eputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of
the Tretheway Family Trust,
Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING
CASE NO.

990908053

vs.
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER,
U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Defendants.

Before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial,
Motion to Amend Ruling or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint.
The parties appeared in Court, and counsel argued on August 31,
2000.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter

under advisement to further consider the arguments, the relevant
case law and statutes and the written submissions of the parties.
Since taking the Motions under advisement, the Court has had an
opportunity

to

consider

or

reconsider

the

law,

all

pleadings, facts and the oral argument in this case.

relevant
Now being

fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision.
In its Motion, the plaintiff contends that the Court should
reconsider its Ruling of March 2, 2 000, wherein the Court granted
defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion for Summary Judgment.

00245
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According to the plaintiff, summary judgment is inappropriate
because there are two issues of material fact which the Court
alluded to in its Ruling which would preclude summary judgment from
being granted.

Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the

Court's reference to the plaintiff's having drafted the Trust Deed
and its statement that "according to defendant Furstenau," the
Camillo Note was not secured by the Trust Deed constitute two
disputed matters of fact which the Court should not have resolved
as a matter of law.
With respect to the first point, the Court agrees with
defendant Furstenau that the reference to authorship was merely in
passing and was not material to the Court's ruling, which was based
on the plain, unambiguous language of the Note and Trust Deed.
Moreover, the Court was not improperly resolving a dispute when it
restated defendant Furstenau's legal position that the Camillo Note
was not secured by the Trust Deed. Whether the Note was secured by
the Trust Deed was the central question of law presented to the
Court by the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.

The

Court's resolution of this legal issue in favor of defendant
Furstenau did not require a factual assessment because the Court
looked strictly to the plain language of the documents involved,
without regard to extrinsic evidence. The Court remains convinced
of the correctness of this decision and again determines that there

00246
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are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the fact that the
Promissory Note and Trust Deed required repayment of $150,000 in
order for all of the Trust Property to be released.

Accordingly,

the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Next, the Court considers the plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
Amendment is in the Court's discretion and not a matter of right,
at this juncture. The Court determines that the plaintiff's Motion
is untimely, having been filed only after the Court had disposed of
all of the legal issues raised in the parties' cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment.

Moreover, the proposed amendment does not raise

any new claims which appear to be legally viable.

Specifically,

the plaintiff's new theory of reformation is not applicable in this
case

because there does not appear to be any evidence of mutual

mistake.

Defendant Furstenau has consistently maintained that he

never understood nor intended to sign a Note for $150,000, or
actually be responsible for repaying $2 03,4 00, which represents the
addition of an unrelated debt which is not the subject of the Note
or the Trust Deed.

(See Furstenau Affidavit).

Accordingly, the

Court concludes that the plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint is
untimely and legally insufficient and therefore denies the Motion
to Amend, in its discretion.
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This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
denying the plaintiff's Motions.

No further Order in connection

with these Motion will be necessary.
Dated this

S

-n

j*

^LESLIE-/A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this QI\

day of

September, 2 000:
Kenneth Parkinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
120 East 3 00 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84 603
David M. Wahlquist
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant,Furstenau
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0120
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FILED DibfRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 0 4 2000
SALT LAKE COUNTY
deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of
the Tretheway Family Trust,
Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING
CASE NO.

990908053

vs.
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR NEBEKER,
U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Nevada corporation,
Defendants.

Before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion for New Trial,
Motion to Amend Ruling or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint.
The parties appeared in Court, and counsel argued on August 31,
2 000.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter

under advisement to further consider the arguments, the relevant
case law and statutes and the written submissions of the parties.
Since taking the Motions under advisement, the Court has had an
opportunity

to

consider

or

reconsider

the

law,

all

pleadings, facts and the oral argument in this case.

relevant
Now being

fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision.
In its Motion, the plaintiff contends that the Court should
reconsider its Ruling of March 2, 2000, wherein the Court granted
defendant Robert Furstenau's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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judgment

is

inappropriate

because there are two issues of material fact which the Court
alluded to in its Ruling which would preclude summary judgment from
being granted.

Specifically, the plaintiff

contends that the

Court's reference to the plaintiff's having drafted the Trust Deed
and its statement that "according to defendant Furstenau," the
Camillo Note was not secured by the Trust Deed constitute two
disputed matters of fact which the Court should not have resolved
as a matter of law.
With respect to the first point, the Court agrees with
defendant Furstenau that the reference to authorship was merely in
passing and was not material to the Court's ruling, which was based
on the plain, unambiguous language of the Note and Trust Deed.
Moreover, the Court was not improperly resolving a dispute when it
restated defendant Furstenau's legal position that the Camillo Note
was not secured by the Trust Deed. Whether the Note was secured by
the Trust Deed was the central question of law presented to the
Court by the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.
Court's resolution

The

of this legal issue in favor of defendant

Furstenau did not require a factual assessment because the Court
looked strictly to the plain language of the documents involved,
without regard to extrinsic evidence.

The Court remains convinced

of the correctness of this decision and again determines that there
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are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the fact that the
Promissory Note and Trust Deed required repayment of $150,000 in
order for all of the Trust Property to be released.

Accordingly,

the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Next, the Court considers the plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
Amendment is in the Court's discretion and not a matter of right,
at this juncture. The Court determines that the plaintiff's Motion
is untimely, having been filed only after the Court had disposed of
all of the legal issues raised in the parties' cross-Motions for
Summary Judgment.

Moreover, the proposed amendment does not raise

any new claims which appear to be legally viable.

Specifically,

the plaintiff's new theory of reformation is not applicable in this
case

because there does not appear to be any evidence of mutual

mistake.

Defendant Furstenau has consistently maintained that he

understood and intended to sign a Note for $150,000, but not to be
responsible for repaying or by signing any note agreeing to pay,
$203,400, which represents the addition of an unrelated debt which
is not the subject of the Note or the Trust Deed.
Affidavit).

(See Furstenau

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiff's

proposed Amended Complaint is untimely and legally insufficient and
therefore denies the Motion to Amend, in its discretion.
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This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
denying the plaintiff's Motions.

No further Order in connection

with these Motion will be necessary.
Dated this

o4P

day of September, 2000.
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HAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this

day of

September, 2 000:
Kenneth Parkinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84 603
David Me Wahlquist
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant Furstenau
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0120
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D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872),
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), and
KENNETH PARKINSON (6778), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

J:\kbp\treth.not
Our File No. 25,213

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of
the Tretheway Family Trust,

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C., and
ADVANCED PROPERTIES
INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Nevada
corporation,

Case No. 990908053
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants.
Plaintiff Sandra L. Tretheway hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the
Court's Ruling dated September 25, 2000, from the ruling dated May 24, 2000, and from all
other adverse rulings in this case. All rulings were made by the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis.

•si

DATED this ^ - " d a y of October, 2000.

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: .
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, this

^ ^ day of October, 2000, postage prepaid.
David M. Wahlquist, Esq.
Merrill F. Nelson, Esq.
Kirton & McConkie
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the
Tretheway Family Trust,

:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT FURSTENAU

vs.

:

Civil No. 990908053

ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C., and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Nevada corporation,

:
:
:
:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss.
)

I, Robert Furstenau, do hereby affirm and depose on oath as follows:
1. On or about February 1,1999,1 signed a Promissory Note ("Note"), drafted by
plaintiff, promising to repay to plaintiff a loan of $ 150,000. (Exh. 1.)
2. On or about that same day, I also signed a Deed of Trust ("Trust Deed"), also drafted
by plaintiff, for the purpose of securing payment of the Note. (Exh. 2.)

00032

3. The property conveyed by the Trust Deed consists of two separate parcels, an
apartment/condominium complex and a gas station, whose legal descriptions are set forth in the
Exhibit A attached to the Trust Deed ("Trust Property").
4. On or about June 23, 1999,1 paid to plaintiff the full amount owing on the Note and
requested reconveyance of the Trust Property. There has been no default in payment of the Note.
(Exh. 3.)
5. Plaintiff subsequently reconveyed the apartment/condominium complex, but refused,
and still refuses, to reconvey the gas station until I pay an additional $53,400, plus interest, to
satisfy a separate, unrelated note described as the "Camillo note." (Exh. 4.)
6. The "Camillo note," referred to in the third release provision of the Note, is not
secured by the Trust Deed, but by separate property described as Lot 16, Taylorsville Park
Subdivision. (Exh. 5.)
DATED t h i s 2 2 ^ day of August, 1999.

Robert Fursten

CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On this

of August, 1999, before me, a notary public, personally appeared ROBERT

FURSTENAU, who signed the foregoing document in my presence and who swore or affirmed
to me that his signature is voluntary and the document truthful.
6&aammmummmmmmmmmmm
NOTARY PUQUC

WTRIC1A HARRIS

5 1 2 5 * * * 2100 Sour*
UftUfttCty.Utah 84120
My Commdsion Expires: M 9 - 2 0 0 1
State of Utah

W:\60O0\6233\0003\MfnAfTFurstcnauPld.wpd

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this "ZTr^ day of August, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Affidavit to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
D. David Lambert
Leslie W. Slaugh
Kenneth Parkinson
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, UT 84603

Jj£J^
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PROMISSORY

NOTE SECURED BY ASSIGNMENT OF NOTE AND DEED OF TRUST
BUSINESS LOAN
Amount:$150,000.00
Salt Lake City , Ut.
Interest Rate:

IS*

Date: February 1, 1999

PARTIES:
Lender: Sandra Tretheway, Trustee of the Tretheway Family
Trust, dated May 9, 1991, whose residence and mailing address is
2013 Spring Oaks Dr. Springvj.lle, Ut. 84563 and will'be referred to
as "Lender".
Borrowers:

Blair Nebeker
1212 E. MOSS
MIDVALE, UT. 84057

PHONE 001 558S777

BOB FURSTENAU
7579 S. MARY ESTER CIRCLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
U.P. N. L.C.
1212 E. MOSS
MIDVALE, UT. 84057

PHONE 801 5585777

ADVANCED PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC, A
NEVADA CORPORATION
1212 E. MOSS
MIDVALE, UT. 84057 PHONE 801 5585777
BORROWER'S PROMISE:
In return for a loan We have received of $150,0,00.00
this amount will be called "principal") , BORROWERS promise to pay
to the order of Lender, at the above address as follows:
PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST:
BORROWERS will repay to the Lender the principal amount of
the loan with interest at the rate of 15% per year until the full
amount of the loan has been repaid-: Interest to commence the 1 day
of FEBRUARY , 1999. The monthly payment of interest shall be made
on the first day of each and every month commencing MARCH 1, IS)99
which shall be the sum of $1875.00 per month on the first day of
each month commencing March 1, 19 99 paid directly from Borrower to
Lender.
FULL PAYMENT:
The unpaid balance of the LOAN and any unpaid interest
shall be completely paid on or before August 1, 1999

1
Exhibit 1

PREPAYMENT PENALTY:
Even though BORROWER is not required to do so, BORROWER may
make other payments to pay off the loan in addition to the payments
described above without penalty.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS:
Any payments BORROWERS make will be used first no pay the
interest due on the loan, second to. pay any penalties and the
balance shall be applied to the loan balance.
IMMEDIATE PAYMENT:
If BORROWERS fail to make any payments required by thir;
Promissory Loan Note, the Lender will have the right to demand that
BORROWERS immediately pay the full amount of the balance of the
loan and any interest that We owe on that amount.
Oix payments there is no grace period. The money to be in
LENDERS POSSESSION on the due date. So long as the envelope is
postmarked 4 days prior to the due date of the monthly payment it
is deemed to arrive on time. If postmarked after 4 days or is not
sent: to the correct address the date of delivery to lender is
determined by actual delivery. Borrower in addition to all other
penalties set forth herein shall pay $350.00 for each late payment
on demand of Lender.
In the event Borrower fails to make any two payments,
consecutively or otherwise, when due, the interest rate goes to
21% for all the past due payments and until three months three
months payments are made when due<. When three consecutive months
payments are made on time the interest drops back down to 15%. If
not the penalty continues until three consecutive months have been
paid on time. If there* are two late payments again at any time
during the period of the loan the same applies again and the 21S?
continues until the note is paid off. The 2l5r rate also becomes
effective if the Borrower allows the property to go into
foreclosure or the borrower goes into bankruptcy whether voluntary
or involuntary.
(The foregoing is not an extension of time to pay but is strictly
a penalty provision to get borrower to pay on time.
COLLECTION COSTS:
If the Lender must hire an attorney to help collect any
payments Borower required to make by this Promissory Loan Note, or
to collect the unpaid loan principal and interest, Borrower agrees
to pay the Lender's attorney a reasonable fee. If a lawsuit ir>
filed to collect on this Promissory Loan Note, Borrower will also
pay, in addition to a reasonable attorney's fee, the Lender's court
2

nnnQ ^

costs.
By signing this Note, everyone who has signed as a Borrower
understands that ho or she could be held individually and
personally responsible for repayment of the whole unpaid loan
amount, plus interest, attorney's fees and court costs. That is,
the Lender may collect the whole unpaid amount of the loan from any
one of us without having to collect from any other signer.
TRUST DEED
IN THE EVENT OF FORECLOSURE OR HIE ADVANCEMENT OF ANY MONIES
ANY AND ALL MONIES DUE UNDER THE NOTE PLUS ALL COSTS OF FORECLOSURE
AND/OR ANY ADVANCES OF FUNDS MADE BY LENDERS TO PROTECT THE
SECURITY OF THIS LOAN SHALL BEAR INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 2 0* PER
ANNUM, NON COMPOUNDED.
POINTS:
Any points paid in advance "on account of this loan are
considered premiums and shall not be applied to the reduction of
principal or any interest payments.
CONFLICT: If there is any conflict between the terms of this note
and the Trust Deed securing this note, the terms of the note are
controlling.
RELEASES:
1. THIS NOTE IS SECURED IN ADDITION TO OTHER SECURITY BY A
SECOND TRUST DEED ON THE PROPERTY ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT "A"
Lender -will give a partial release for each condominum sold upon
the property upon the payment of the sum of $20,000.00 per
condominimum eold to the Lender.
2. Upon the payment of $15 0,000.0 0 to Lender and there has
been no default in any of the payments by Borrowers to Lender the
Trust Deed described in Exhibit: "A" shall be released.
3. The first trust deed on the property described in Exhibit
"B" attached hereto shall be released on the payment of the som of
$53,400.00 for the purchase of the note Described as the. Camillo
note, now owned by Tipton Family Trust for the sum of $53,400.00
plus interest in the sum of $5,696.00 which is interet due as of
February 1, 1999 plus interest at the rate of $712,00 per month
thereafter until paid, plus any and all attorney fees paid to Paul
Halliday in the case of Dicamiilo vs Tipton and Tipton vs Kathryn
Abbott. Upon payment of same Tipton shall assign the note and Deed
of trust to Blair Nebeker along with any papers necessary to
transfer the case to Nebeker and- make him the Plaintiff in paid
case >

3
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Nebekcr will hold Tipton Family Trust free and harrales from any
damages arising out of the Dicamillp note,
"BORROWERS"

Z^~

Blair Nebeker
1212 E, MOSS
MIDVALE, UT. 84

PHONE 8 0 1 5 5 8 5 7 7 7

BOB FURSTENAU/
7579 S. T-1ARY E ^ E R ^ I R C L1.
EE
SALT LAXE CITY, UTAH,

U.P. N. L.C,
1212 E. MOSS
MIDVALE, UT. 84057

ADVANCED

PROPERTIES

^ ^ >

{n~. - Wb&&6fr
PHONE 801 5585777

r^RNATIIONiL,

MIDVALE, UT. 04057

INC, A

PHONE 801 553577/

00033

nflR n '&_ n s g

recn

enr*
KAH Tax N<**» Trf

Sec

u r 7**-*?
WARRANTY

l

DEED

HAIPU F. ClJUaXB *n4 OJPAk A. CLARKE* Tlr«*i©e» cf tM O t * * nvintfTirart,
GKAKTOK-

i

of Satt L*Jb? Cfc^r, Coantj ctf SoH X-»)^, S^tc *f UiA, iwrthy Gxxt^r* *«i WsrnxrtJ to
if ADVANCED f aOPKKTIZS IKTERKAITOMAX^ I N C « Ncv*d* Corjys^iiaci
I /pad BOB ^USSIKRAir
GSAJCffiE

DOLLABS

for the wna. aTT«2.ffnd QC/1W ($10.00)
urd ether good m 4 "nduthJc cmekfcrrtttoq
the b&jviag Z*ecnlx?ltt%c*cf J***3 in S*U U « C^iftfy, &teU cC Uiah:
I 8e«A*i*&o<{£ctkhit'A*

i i«cseB2ALKai6-o5.i7Mia«aai^o8-i7^ou.
WTXtfESS tb«i W J cf *ad Greater, this 5& &gr of J*a<«T, 19WSignoa m liK pciouiKt: ^

CLAHKB UVDJG l^UST

GEAOTOX

7

^yZ^/ ^ W ^

£*4///7

ORDER NO, 490594

Form No. 1344-A (.1962)
ALTA P l a i n Language Coraoitrceriti

DESCRIPTION

Beginning at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB HEIGHTS, Plat "A",
and running thence North 0°01' East 215.79 fest; tbance South 51*02•
East 345 feel:; thence No^th 39°45f West, 268,31 feex to Che point o'r
beginning.

The above described property also known by the street address of;
24S0 EAST PARLEYS W£Y, S 4 L T LfcXE CITY; UTAH 84109
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WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:
Sandra Tretheway, Trustee
c/o Tretheway Law Offices
2018 Spring Oaks Drive
Springville, Utah 84663
E-490594AW
DEED OF TRUST
^ W I T i l ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
This Deed of Trust, made this _J
day of February, 1999, between Blair Ncbeker, Bob Furstenau,
U.P.N., L,C, and Advanced Property International, Inc., a Nevada corporation, as Trustor, whose address is

JLg25£. £36P %>• SU^ICT foflO*! . FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation - Utah Division, as Trustee, and Sandra Tretheway,
Trustee of the Tretheway Family Trust, dated May 9, 1991, as Beneficiary, WITNESS: That Trustor
CONVEYS AND WARRANTS to trustee in trust, with power of sale, the following described property,
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
Sec Exhibit "A" attached and made a part hereof
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements,
rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now
or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power
an authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and
profits.
For the Purpose of Securing:
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof in the principal sum
of $150,000.00, made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest
as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each
agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as hereafter may
be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they
are secured by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiaiy under
or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided.
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agrees:
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; lo complete or restore
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner nny building which mny be constructed, damaged or destroyed thereon; to comply widi
oil laws, covenants nnd restrictions affecting snid property; not to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit nny act
upon said property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary,
the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general; und% if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being obtained for the
purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property Trustor further agrees;
(a) To commence construction promptly nnd lo pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance
with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect snid property at all limes during construction.
Trustee, upon presentation lo it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor under this
numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true nnd conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder.
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on the improvements now
existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance shall be carried in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss
payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiaiy. In the event of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary,
who may make proof of loss, and each insurance company concerned is hereby auUiorized and directed (o make payment for such loss
directly lo Beneficiaiy, instead of to Trustor and Beneficiaiy jointly, nnd die insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied by
Beneficiary, at its option, to the reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to die restoration or repair of the property dumnged. In
the event that die Trustor shall fail to provide satisfactory hazard insurance, the Beneficiaiy may procure, on the Trustor's behalf, insurance
in favor of the Beneficiary alone. If insurance cannot, be secured by the Trustor to provide die required coverage, this will constitute an
act of default under the terms of this Deed of Trust,

3. To deliver to, pny for and rnnintnin willi Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such evidence of tillc
ns Beneficing may require, including attracts of title or policies of title insurance and any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements
thereto.
4. To appear in nnd defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said propqly, or the rights
or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; -and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay
all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum inclined by Beneficiary or Trustee,
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all (axes and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments upon
water company slock and nil rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said property; to pay, when
due, nil encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at any lime appear to be prior or suj>erior
hereto; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6. To pay to Beneficiary monthly, in advance an umount, as estimated by Beneficiary in its discretion, sufficient to pay all taxes
and assessments alVecling said property, and nil premiums on insurance therefor, as nnd when the same shall become due.
7. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act ns herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but wilhoul
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may; Make
or do die same in such manner and lo such cxlcnl as either may deem necessary to protect Ihe security hereof, Beneficiaiy or Trustee being
authorized to enter upon said property for such puiposcs; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting lo affect
the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiaiy or Tnislec; pay, purdia.se, contest, or compromise any encumbrance, ehnrgc or
lien which in the judgment of cither appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend
whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cosl of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay
his reasonable ttcs.
8. To pay immediately nnd without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiaiy or Trustee, wilh interest from date of
expenditure at the rate of Fifteen Percent (15%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby.
9. To pay lo Beneficiary a "late charge" if any payment is not made on the payment dale in tiic amount of $350.00. Amounts in
default shall bear intcresl at a rate of 2\9A per annum.
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
10. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, and odier
payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option lo commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or
proceedings, or lo make any compromise or .settlement, in coimeclion wilh such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards,
damages, rights of action and proceeds, moluding ihe proceeds of any policies offirc and oilier insurance affecting said property, are hereby
assigned lo Beneficiaiy, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply the same on any indebtedness
secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and
proceeds ns Beneficiaiy or Trustee may require.
11. At any time and from time lo lime upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Deed of
Trust and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and retention) wilhoul affecting Ihe liability of any person
for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, and without releasing the interest of any party joining in this Deed of Tiust, Trustee
may (a) consent lo the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any rcslriclion thereon;
(c) join m any subordination or other agreement affecting Otis Deed of Trust or the lien or charge thereof; (d) grant any extension or
modification of the terms of litis loan; (c) reconvcy, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in nny reconveyance
may be described as "the persons entitled thereto*, and the recitals therein of any mailers of facts shall be conclusive proof of the
truthfulness thereof. Tmstor agrees lo pay reasonable trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
12. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns lo Beneficiary, during ihe continuance of these trusts, all rents, issues, royalties,
and profils of Ihe property affected by this Deed of Trust and of nny personal property located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the
payment of aiw indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have Ihe right to collect nil
such rents, issues, royalties, and profils earned prior lo default ns they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid,
Trustor's right lo collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, wilh or without taking possession of the
property affected hereby, to collect all rents, loyalties, issues, and profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiaiy at any time orfromlime
to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any maimer affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, nnd
authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiaiy to collect, shall be, or be construed
lo be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor n subordination of die lien
or charge of this Deed of Trust lo any such lennncy, lease or option.
13. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, cither in person, by agent, or by a receiver
lo be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiaiy as such receiver), and wilhoul regard lo the
adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and lake possession of said property or any part thereof, in its
own name sue for or olhci-wi.se collect said rents, issues, and profils, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs
and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order
as Beneficiaiy may determine.
14. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, ortiieproceeds of
fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or releusc
t h e r e o f OS nforL'^nfH shrtll nnt PIUV n r t u n i w n..vr ,^.r f t nll A - n « l ^ « AM ,l..f....lt t , « r « . . ^ , l , r « - i.,ih,lM.I» „..,r «..# , l ^ « .».i^...,.nl {« c-iwli nnllr.*

15, The failure on the part of Beneficiary lo promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not opernte as a waiver of such right and
the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default,
1G. Tunc is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and payable at the option of Bcncficiujy.
In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee lo execute u written notice of default and of election lo cause said
properly to be sold to satisfy the obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said properly or
some pail or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenditures
secured hereby.
17. After the lapse of such lime as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of
default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee without demand on Trustor, shall sell said properly on the
dale and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine
(but subject to any statutory right of Trustor lo direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall
be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United Slates at the lime of sale. The
person conducing the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from lime to lime until it shall be completed and, in
every such case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person i\l the time and place last appointed
for the sale; provided, if the sate is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated i" the notice of sale, notice thereof shall
be given iw the same manner as die original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said
property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the Deed of any matters or facts shall be
conclusive proof of the tmllifulncss thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceed* of
the sale to payment of (1) the cost and expenses of exercising die power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of die Trustee's and
attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums
expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 21°/o per annum from date of expenditure; (A) all other sums
the secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may
deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
18. Trustor ngrecs lo surrender possession of the hereinabove described Trust property lo the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale,
immediately after such sale, in the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor.
19. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby
immediately due and payable and foreclose this Deed of Trust in the maimer provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real
property end Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses incident lliercto, including a reasonable
attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court.
20. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any lime by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county
in which said property or some pnit thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the new
trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such
substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
21. This Deed of Trust shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees,
administrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary* ahull
mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires,
the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
22. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided
by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding
in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
. 1 his Dfeefl of Trust shall be construed according lo the laws of the Stale of Utah
24.. Theliiirldsigned
Trustor requests thai a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him
Thcuirld'
&; he/iiribU fore set forlh.

JAJ • M )

Name.' B. William Nebeker
Its: Manager
iJnal, Inc., a Nevada corporation

Name: Blair Nebcker
lis: President

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
Couuly of
On ihc jL^day ofWuaiy, 1999, A.D. personally before me Dlnir Ncbckcr,
who being by mc duly sworn did say for himself that he is (he President of Advanced
Property International, Inc., a Nevada corporation and that Ihc within and foregoing
instrument WHS signed on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its Board
of Directors and lite said Blair Nebeker acknowledged to me ihnl cor|X)j*ftlion executed the

\aliClk I'.iXtt

Notary Public
ALISHAA.WHITE
330 EASI 400 South

5.AH Lnko Cily. Lflah 6 < t t l
My Commission Dpiros
Scplembor2G.2000

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

:ss.
)

On the I ' day of February, 1999, personally appeared before mc, Blair Nebeker the
er of die foregoing document who acknowledged to mc dial lie executed the same.

Notary Public""" " 1
ALISHAA.WHITE

Notary Public

STATEOFUTAII

)

County of Snlt Lake

)

S f L a k * City. Utah 84 m
W/Ccmimfjston Expiry
S«Pt»nibef 25.2000

I

- ^

^-.

^ iL°£U(ah_

I

a

On Ihc J
day of February, 1999, personally appeared before me, Bob Furstenou the
signer ofUic foregoing document who acknowledged to mc thnt he executed die same.

Notary Public
ALISHAA.WHITE

- - ^ 1 ,
STATEOFUTAII

330 Ens! 400 Sculh
Sail Lake Cify.Ulah 8 4 i l l
My Commission Cxpiros
5cpiatnbor 25. 2000

I

^ato_o£Utah^

J

)

County of
On the J _ day of Jurrmny, 1999, A.D. personally before mc D. William
Nebeker, who being by me duly sworn did say for himself Ihnl he is the Monngcr of U.F.N.
L.C., a Utah limited liability company and Ihnl die within ond foregoing instrument was
signed on behalf of said limited liability company by authority of a Articles of Organization
and the snid Li. Willi/im Nebeker ncknowledged lo mc thai limited liability company
executed ihu same.

Notary

. No^pTibTc"*"
ALSHAA,WHITE
2 r

oC,t

*w«'ie«ni

*&lumber 25. 2000

'

REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby lias been paid in Jul I)

TO:

TRUSTEE

The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of die note and all other indebtedness secured by the within Twsl Deed. Said note
together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby retjueslcd and diirctcd'
on payment to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above mentioned, and all other
evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, nnd to rcconvey,
without warranty, lo the parties designated by the tenns of said Trust Deed, all of the estate now held by you thereunder.
DATED

Mail reconveyance lo:

,19_

EXHIBIT "A"

Commencing at (he Souiiieast conver ofLot 8, Block 55, Plat "A", Salt Lake Qly Survey, in the dly of
Salt Lake County of Salt Lake; SUAeofUfeh, and running thence North 54 feet; tlrcnce West 165 fed;
llience South 54 feet; tlience Hast 165 foctlo die point of Commencement.
Also, commencing at a point 54 &i North of(he Soutteast comer ofLot 8, Block 55, Plat "A", Salt
Lake City Survey, and running th-nce North 28.5 feet; thence West 165fed;thence Soulh 28.5 feet;
tlience East 165 fed to the plxe of Commencement

AND

Beginning at the Southwest corner of COUNTRY CLUB HEIGHTS, Plat
"A", and running thence North 0°01l East 215.79 feet; thence
South 51°02f East 345 feet; thence North 89045' West, 268,31
feet to the point of beginning.
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Exhibit 3

n n n r. n

WH5M pECflRDfiD, MAIL TO:
Suruly Tlib Agency
W1 East 560Q South ilf 100
Murray, UUh 241Q7
nM40a77C/

07/07/?? * H I Rl
1 3 -GO
NANCY WORKMAN
R£CCRCEHr SALT UJE CWKTTI 'JTAH
CL^SIY TITLE
REC 5T:Z JWANSOX
iC£?UTY - VI

SUBSTITUTION o f YRUSTEE and DEED OF RECOffl/EYAMCE ( P A W I A L )
CO

I>
CO

o

SoniraTfbthcwsy, Tru:Ue of ihi Trstbcway Family Trwl dated May 5, T2S1rUrteOwner an* Holder :f the &£a
is:u:cd by the Dead of Tru«lf dalad FqBru^iry 1, 1393, rrptfa by 2Wr NihLor, Bab fvirrfenatf, U.P.N., l.C„ and
Advancad Praporty Inlarnotionsl, Inc. «is Truster lo First Am«fiwn Title (nsufinsD Carnpsny 35 Trmioa, /or ilia
toent cf Sand/a Trcthcway.Trwrott of tha Tramway Family Trust, foted May 9,139I uSencfi^ry, wlifpbDcfc'J
of Trust wis ricorded In lha of fie* of th« CcUnly Racnrdtrof Sdt Ub* Caunty, I M , In Beck e 24a, Dt pags 4727,
Eniry Wumbe/ 7241 flBS. recafrf«d dsio af Fobnury Tf 1939, KEAEBY wbsiJtuUs SurMy TIUo Acsncy BSTrusiec in
Ifou sf the abo>/c r.oirai Truslcs under sifd D«td of Trail,
SLcfiXy Till? AQurcyharabyaciipUia)dflppo!nlm:nU5Trv5t£Sond«r laid Durd of Trust oniwSuccejsa'TjvrUfl,
pursuantto iht rarest o^»Jd Cwn• r Mil fkldor,Js0$ to^Y Wjjijfey, without W2;rin(y, to the perjan or persens
oftlillad lhorclo, tho i r u s t ^ p s / ^ n o w fva i f iy"ifi / % s u « Oder's aid Trust Dead.
Said Dttf d of Trusl coVcrVfaaJ properly situated In Salt Lskf County, Utah, desefftatf 33 fallow.
S**« AfUihud Exhinft 'A"
WWimssWHERECFilDvmflr} Sandra Tralhfway.Twxiflfl af lhaTrf th£iv3y Family Trart, AtcdMay 9,1S21 and
SufEly Tllfa Arjency, i s Successor Trvsfoo have ciuwd ih:uc prc«nti lo hi Mtciilad by lh«lf duly Eu&arfcsd
officr/i, tfc&*? day of ^ M £ T , JS8S,
TfcLWjy f W y Trv^, Ulad M»y 3,1fl3!

ST; - ^ W f ? W^/^fir-y^
/"

TlflA T.vjfac

cou.'ity QIJAL^ I A X 3
On 6 ^ f " T l
_, b*ftf»jni, ihi undRA'Jjnadx i Nflary
Mi??, to md tsr tijd CoUftly and SUU, ?«ricnjfly typfiirsd _
_ CUyv^H*. "TKfi^CA^vn lo jpa fa 5?f IM "? . ... l
. _ o / tin fimfiy wust that errciated (he within fcutr-jmanl.
k.vwn [Q tr.a (a hi ihi pt»«n(ij Y»IIC «*>cutcii da WltJiin
fcslrwtaAt an khtlf tf lha fimJy tfvxt (ft»r«in flanvi md
KkiiowL-dtfird IQ In* Hut iuel| tswTy vtfit itacubif OMJ v^(h(n

IniiruflU'iipiifwptiiio i /iiatullonfff lfs ?ru*iQ«U)»

•L.^oJE^
RaiV..*^h:

On .
7/</Qft
bqrcri n c t h i unr!crii5f,e4. ^ NaliT
Ptbii^, pj»(iai!ifij »op* we(Cr«f^ Worihinaisf. kr r^n iu nv» ra U
ttf frrilornr of wa csr^rT/fcn <h*( rt4;u!wJ Jirg v!u,'n
!/urttmafll lni\*n (7 mi |a i i i>>< ;</icn{;/ who tzi'jj>d tf*
w^Mi/uffflntBisbchiirsf Lha ccrpflrtlfcnuvMin n»»wli«;d
ftflVftawfiijijf isrt*lhi( ii/fth csrper4!lcfi n?iu^d ihc u/l:Wn
lnit,«<jncal pwmnl to !l» ^y-Uwi cr« usc.'iiicn al it? t:iri of
dTrtctiiri.
WITNESS my hwdwJ ojpoalftftl.

>

HvUrj fuifle
Wy c««tgnai.*on t*?i»w:
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EXHIBIT "A"

Commencing at the Southeast corner of LoC 8, Block 55, Plat "A", Sale Lake Cicy Survey, In the C
of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and running ihonca North 54 feet; tbenco Wq$t 1
feet; thence 5oulh 54 feet; thenoa East 165 feet to the point of commencement.
AL50, commencing at a point 54 feet North of the Southeast comer of Lot 8, Block 55, Plat "A",
Sail Lake City Sun/ey, and running thence North 23.5 feel; thence West 165 feet; thence South '
ZS.5 feet; thence East 165 feci to the place of commencement.
SITUATE IN SALT LAKE COUNTY

David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant Robert Furstenau
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDRA L. TRETHEWAY, trustee of the
Tretheway Family Trust,

:
:
:
:

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT FURSTENAU

vs.

:

Civil No. 990908053

ROBERT FURSTENAU, BLAIR
NEBEKER, U.P.N.L.C, and ADVANCED
PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
Nevada corporation,

:
:
:
:

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:

)
:ss.
)

I, Robert Furstenau, do hereby affirm and depose on oath as follows:
1. At the time I signed the $ 150,000 Promissory Note and Deed of Trust dated February
1,1999,1 was not aware and had no knowledge of any so-called "Camillo" debt or note between
Blair Nebeker and the Tretheway Family Trust.

nnilR

2. I never agreed to "incorporate" the Camillo debt into the $150,000 Promissory Note.
3. I never agreed to secure payment of the Camillo debt with the apartments and gas
station described in Exhibit A to the Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust was intended to secure
only payment of the $150,000 loan.
4. My understanding of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust was that the trust
property would be reconveyed upon payment of the $150,000 loan. I was never informed, and
never agreed to payment, of an additional loan.
5. At the time I signed the Promissory Note, no exhibits were attached to the Note. I
understood the "Exhibit A" referred to in the second release provision, on page 3 of the Note, to
be the Exhibit A that was attached to the Deed of Trust.
DATED this ^

day of October, 1999.

Robert F

CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT
On this J_r: day of October, 1999, before me, a notary public, personally appeared ROBERT
FURSTENAU, who signed the foregoing document in my presence and who swore or affirmed
to me that his signature is voluntary and the document truthful.

(V
W:\6000\623 3\0OO3\Mfn AiTFurstenau 1 Pld. wpd

NOTARY PUBLIC
N&MttftJ8UC

PATRICIA HARRIS
5l25W«st 2100 Sown,
$ * U H i City. Utah 84 v.
My CWMnfesKOT Expires. 1 - State off:-'
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TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
OF TRIAL COURTS
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken
from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the
appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by
law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time
allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but
is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which
may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as
well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as the
appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the
appellate court, the party making the original application shall be known as
the petitioner and any other party as the respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or
parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken.
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give notice
of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof
to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last known address. A
certificate evidencing such service shall be filed with the notice of appeal. If
counsel of record is served, the certificate of service shall designate the name
of the party represented by that counsel.
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice of separate,
joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the
clerk of the trial court the filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial
court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and payment
of the required fee, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately transmit a
certified copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy
of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond has
been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the action in the
trial court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title does not
contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be added to the title.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 1996; November 1, 1999.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The designation of parties is changed to conform to the
designation of parties m the federal appellate
courts.

The rule is amended to make clear that the
mere designation of an appeal as a "crossappeal" does not eliminate liability for payment
of the filing and docketing fees. But for the
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(insert name), grantee, of
(insert place of residence),
for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe
the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
(month/day/year).
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall
have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his
heirs and assigns, of the premises therein named, together
with all the appurtenances, rights, and privileges thereunto
belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs, and
personal representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the
premises; t h a t he has good right to convey the same; that he
guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and assigns in the quiet
possession thereof; that the premises are free from all encumbrances; and t h a t the grantor, his heirs, and personal representatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in
the grantee, his heirs, and assigns against all lawful claims
whatsoever. Any exceptions to these covenants may be briefly
inserted in the deed following the description of the land.
57-1-13. F o r m of quitclaim d e e d — JEffect.
Conveyances of land may also be substantially in the
following form:
QUITCLAIM D E E D
. (here insert name), grantor, s of.
(insert
place of residence), hereby quitclaims to
(insert
name), grantee, of
(here insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described tract
*of land in
County, Utah, to
wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
(month/day/year).
A quitclaim deed when executed as required by law shall
ave the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest, and
state of the grantor in and to the premises therein described
nd all rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto bemging, at the date of the conveyance.
2000
7-1-14. F o r m of m o r t g a g e — Effect.
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the following
inn:
MORTGAGE
(here insert name), mortgagor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby mortgages to
(insert name), mortgagee, of
(insert place of
residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following
described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to wit:
(here describe the premises).
This mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness (here state amount and form of indebtedness,
maturity, rate of interest, by a n d to whom payable, and
where).
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments
on said premises, and the sum of
dollars attorneys'
fee in case of foreclosure.
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this
(month/day/year).
^ mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the
ect of a conveyance of the land therein described, together
h all the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto
onging, to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns, and legal
>resentatives, as security for the payment of the indebted>s thereon set forth, with covenants from the mortgagor of

57-1-21

general warranty of title, and that all taxes and assessments
levied and assessed upon the land described, during the
continuance of the mortgage, will be paid previous to the day
appointed for the sale of such lands for taxes; and may be
foreclosed as provided by law upon any default being made in
any of the conditions thereof as to payment of either principal,
interest, taxes, or assessments.
2000
57-1-15. Effect of r e c o r d i n g a s s i g n m e n t of m o r t g a g e .
The recording of an assignment of a mortgage is not in itself
considered notice of the assignment to the mortgagor, his
heirs, or personal representatives so as to invalidate any
payment made by them or either of them to the mortgagee.
1988

57-1-16 to 57-1-18.

Repealed.

1988,1994

57-1-19. Trust d e e d s — Definitions of t e r m s .
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36:
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise
designated in a trust deed as the person for whose benefit
a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest.
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property
by a t r u s t deed as security for the performance of an
obligation.
(3) T r u s t deed" means a deed executed in conformity
with Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real
property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of
an obligation of the trustor or other person named in t h e
deed to a beneficiary.
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real
property is conveyed by trust deed, or his successor in
interest.
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth
in Section 57-1-1.
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed
by the trust deed.
1988
57-1-20.

Transfers in trust of real property — P u r p o s e s
— Effect.
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure
the performance of an obligation of the trustor or any other
person named in the trust deed to a beneficiary. All right, title,
interest and claim in and to the trust property acquired by the
trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the execution of the t r u s t deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for
the obligation or obligations for which the trust property is
conveyed in like manner as if acquired before execution of the
trust deed.
1961
57-1-21. Trustees of trust d e e d s — Qualifications.
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(i) any member of the Utah State Bar;
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section
7-1-103, or insurance company authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United
States;
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a t r u s t
business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the
United States;
(iv) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of Utah;
(V) any agency of the United States government; or
(vi) any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm Credit
Administration or its successor,
(b) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a
trust deed existing prior to the effective date of this
chapter, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to
t h a t trust deed.

REAL ESTATE

57-1-30

balance of the proceeds with the clerk of the district court of
the county in which the sale took place. Upon depositing the
balance, the trustee shall be discharged from all further
responsibility and the clerk shall deposit the proceeds with the
state treasurer subject to the order of the district court. 1997
Sale of trust property bj' trustee — Corporate
stock evidencing water rights given to secure
t r u s t deed.
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights used,
intended to be used, or suitable for use on the trust property
and which are hypothecated to secure an obligation secured by
a trust deed may be sold with the trust property, or any part
thereof, at the trustee's sale in the manner provided in this
act.
1961

90

by

as trustor, in which
is named as beneficiary and
as trustee, and filed for record
(month/day/year),
and recorded in Book
, Page
, Records of
County, (or
filed of record
(month/day/year), with recorder's entry
No
,
County), Utah.
(legal description)

57-1-30.

57-1-31,

Trust d e e d s — Default i n performance of obligations secured — Reinstatement — Cancellation of recorded notice of default.
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any
obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity
date fixed in t h e obligation, become due or been declared due
by reason of a breach or default in the performance of any
obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the
payment of interest or of any installment of principal, or by
reason of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance with t h e
terms of the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for
insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in accordance
with terms of the obligation or of the trust deed, the trustor or
his successor in interest in the trust property or any part
thereof or any other person having a subordinate lien or
encumbrance of record thereon or any beneficiary under a
subordinate trust deed, at any time within three months of the
filing for record of notice of default under the trust deed, if the
power of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or
his successor in interest the entire amount then due under the '
terms of the trust deed (including costs and expenses actually
incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust deed,
and t h e trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other
t h a n t h a t portion of the principal as would not then be due h a d
no default occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore
existing and, thereupon, all proceedings theretofore had or
instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and
remain in force and effect the same as if no such acceleration
h a d occurred.
(2) If t h e default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in
the manner provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his
assignee, shall, on demand of an>7 person having an interest in
the t r u s t property, execute and deliver to him a request to the
trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of
the recorded notice of default under the trust deed; and any
beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a
period of 30 days after such demand, refuses to request the
trustee to execute and deliver this cancellation is liable to the
person entitled to such request for all damages resulting from
this refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee
or beneficiary, or both, or the execution of a trustee's deed
constitutes a cancellation of a notice of default. Otherwise, a
cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a trust deed
is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient if made and executed by the trustee in substantially t h e
following form:
Cancellation of Notice of Default
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed
for record
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book
,
Page — , Records of
County, (or filed of record
(month/day/year), with recorder's entry No
,
County),
Utah, which notice of default refers to the trust deed executed

Signature of Trustee

2000

57-1-32.

Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to
recover balance due upon obligation for
which trust deed was given as security —
Collection of costs and attorney's fees.
At any time within three months after any sale of property
under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon t h e obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action
the complaint shall set forth t h e entire amount of the indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for
which such property was sold, and the fair market value
thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the
court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the
property sold. The court may not render judgment for more
t h a n the amount by which the amount of t h e indebtedness
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's
and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of t h e
property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under
this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an
action under this section.
1985
57-1-33.

Repealed.

1994

57-1-33.1. Reconveyance of a trust deed.
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been
satisfied, t h e trustee shall, upon written request by the
beneficiary, reconvey the trust property.
(b) At t h e time t h e beneficiary requests a reconveyance
under Subsection (l)(a), the beneficiary shall deliver to
the trustee or the trustee's successor in interest the trust
deed and the note or other evidence t h a t the obligation
securing t h e trust deed h a s been satisfied.
(2) The reconveyance under Subsection (1) may designate
the grantee as "the person or persons entitled thereto." 1995
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee — Foreclosure of trust deed — Limitation of actions.
The trustee's sale of property under a t r u s t deed shall be
made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be
commenced, within t h e period prescribed by law for the
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by t h e
trust deed.
1961
57-1-35.

Trust d e e d s — Transfer of s e c u r e d d e b t s a s
transfer of security.
The transfer of any debt secured by a t r u s t deed shall
operate as a transfer of the security therefor.
1961
57-1-36.

Trust deeds — Instruments entitled to be recorded — Assignment of a beneficial interest.
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a
beneficial interest under a trust deed, notice of default,
trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust property, and any
instrument by which any trust deed is subordinated or waived
as to priority, if acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to
be recorded. The recording of an assignment of a beneficial
interest in the t r u s t deed does not in itself impart notice of the
assignment to the trustor, his heirs or personal representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by any of them to
the person holding t h e note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the obligation by the trust deed.
1988
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who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he files
the third-party complaint not later than ten days after he serves his original
answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to
the action. The person served with the summons and third-party complaint,
hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the
third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party
defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert
against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the
plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against
the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff
may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon
shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed
under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the
third-party defendant.
(b) When plaintiff may bring in third party. When a counterclaim is asserted
against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 14(a) and (b), F.R.C.R
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Appellate jurisdiction.
the ground that a claim for relief then exists
Third party by defendant.
against the third-party defendant, but on t h e
—Grounds.
ground t h a t the third-party defendant "may be
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim.
liable" to the defendant in the principal action.
Cited.
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin,'689 P.2d
,
„ , . . , . ..
1344 (Utah 1984).
Appellate jurisdiction.
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.P. 54(b), ap- U n t i m e l m o t i o n t o a „ o w counterclaim.
plies when the trial court orders a separate
T h e trial court did n o t a b u s e its discretion in
Z A t e f ™ ' c r o ^ s : c l .f i m > oounterdaim, or
d e n ^
m o t i o n s t Q a U o w & c o u n t e r c l a i m a n d to
third-party claim and failure to have the case
^
. third
defendants which
were
certified as final by the trial court, leaving
,,
«.
, .i
C1 r 1 0
J
_i.- L r
i.i_ J.
-±
-n j
filed
13 months after an answer to the comlssues and parties before t h a t court, will dei . , w a n,
,
, .
i u r e *i_
l m
Weeks bef
prive t h e appellate court of jurisdiction over an
? ? } , , \ fil?d, a t n d ^
°/
^
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298
scheduled trial date, where reasons for the
(Utah 1991)
untimely motion were inadequate and where
the parties failed to demonstrate that t h e
Third p a r t y by defendant.
court'sTripp
denial
of the motions
resulted
in prejudice.
v. Vaughn,
746 R2d
794 (Utah
Ct.
—Grounds.
App. 1987).
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor
impleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the
Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc.,
defendant in the initial action does so, not on
743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 188
et seq.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84.

A-L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution or
indemnity
from
original tortfeasor,
20
A.L.R.4th 338.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to

Rule 15
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which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the
longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so
order, Specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 15, KR.C.R
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Amendments.
—Actual notice.
—After pretrial order.
—Alternative to dismissal.
Payment of attorney fees.
Prolix complaint.
—Amendment of response.
—Answer.
——To include counterclaim.
—Complaint.
To defeat motion for summary judgment.
lb include damages.
—Considerations.
Prejudice.
—Court's discretion.
Abused.
Not abused.
—Dismissal without opportunity to amend.
—Following dismissal.
—Late amendment.
Day of trial.
During or after trial.
—Pro se petitions.
—Reply amounting to amendment.

—"Responsive pleading."
—Substitution of parties.
Amendment to conform to evidence.
—Allowed.
—Alternative to dismissal.
—Amendment unnecessary.
Consent to try issue.
Evidence supporting findings.
Issue raised by complaint.
—Construction of rule.
—Defense not pleaded.
Affirmative defense.
Issue tried by parties.
—Failure to object to evidence.
—Issues not pleaded.
Mutual mistake.
—Jury instruction as amendment.
—New cause of action.
Child support.
—New theory of recovery.
—Not allowed.
No consent to try issue.
—Notice.
—Prejudice.

